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ABSTRACT 
An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating that some claim about a 
system holds, i.e., is assured. Assurance cases are used to comment about system safety and it serves as a mean to 
show that the systems acceptably satisfy their safety properties. Assurance cases perform rigorous security analysis 
on safety-critical complex systems. In this paper, the analysis done is an approach to documenting an assurance case 
for system security, i.e., a security assurance case. The paper deals with the Assurance cases for Generic Avionic 
Mission Control Computer system, by constructing tangible claims and investigating potential vulnerabilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AVIONICS MISSION CONTROL COMPUTER SYSTEM: 
Airborne mission systems are crucial to the tactical deployment of aircraft such as F-111F/A-18 and the Airborne 
Early Warning and control aircraft. Airborne mission systems may be viewed conceptually as a complex collection 
of interactive systems and components. These include but are not limited to sensors, weapons, navigation and 
communication, electronic warfare, as well as human operators, jointly performing a wide range of independent and 
inter-dependent functions to meet a specific operational mission objective. 
Figure 1 (taken from [1]) shows the overall architecture of a generic avionics mission system (AMS) for a 
combat aircraft. The AMS consists of a number of subsystems connected via a serial data bus (SDB). The SDB is 
controlled by the Mission Control Computer (MCC) on which a number of tasks are being executed. The 
subsystems communicate by the exchange of data/messages across the SDB. 
The Controls and displays of the AMS consist of the head-up display (HUD), the multi-purpose display (MPD), 
the crew keyset (KEYSET), and the hands-on throttle and stick (HOTAS). These components form the man-
machine interface of the AMS. The man-machine interface is controlled by the Display Process subsystem. The 
sensors of the AMS consist of the Air Data Computer (ADC), the Radar, the Inertial Navigation system (INS), the 
Radar Altimeter (RALT), and the Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). The stores contain a number of weapons such as 
missiles and bombs and are controlled by the stores management system. 
MCC is intended to do the following functions: 
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1. Navigation: Compute current aircraft flight data based on inputs from the ADC, INS and RALT. Provide steering 
cues to aircrew. Allow aircrew to update aircraft position. 
2. Radar Control: Control radar mode of operation including contact management. 
3. RWR Control: Set up sectors and frequencies for RWR operation. 
4. Threat Response: Warn aircrew of threats using the MPD tactical display. Trigger automatic chaff dispensation, if 
selected. 
5. Targeting: Designate and track the target of attack. 
6. Weapons Control: Select, aim, and release weapons. 
7. Controls and Displays: Handle aircrew inputs and prepare various data for display on the HUD and MPD. 
8. Built-in Test: Monitor the status of the avionic system and warn aircrew of any problems or failures. 
 
 
Figure 1, Generic Avionics Mission Systems Block Diagram [1] 
 
1.2 ASSURANCE CASES  
An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating that some claim about a 
system holds, i.e., is assured [2]. Initially Assurance cases were used in Europe to comment about system safety and 
it serves as a mean to show that the systems acceptably satisfy their safety properties [3]. Assurance cases for 
security serve as a means of performing rigorous security analysis on such safety-critical complex systems. In this 
paper, our objective is an approach to documenting an assurance case for system security, i.e., a security assurance 
case. The project deals with the Assurance cases for MCC system by constructing tangible claims and investigating 
potential vulnerabilities. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION 
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [6] is a formal language that is used to document the security 
specifications of critical infrastructures. The goal structuring notation is a graphical notation to show how goals 
about the system are systematically and successively decomposed into subgoals until a point, where the argument 
can be supported by evidence. The three building blocks used in developing a security Assurance Case using GSN 
are Claim, Argument and Evidence. 
A claim can be an assertion about a system property which is ultimately determined to be a “Boolean” value, that 
is, it can either be true or false. Sometimes, it may be essential to provide additional information that is not directly 
explicit in the claim. Arguments show how claims are decomposed into subclaims and eventually supported by 
evidence [4] [7]. The starting claim “MCC acceptably satisfies the avionics specifications” is decomposed into 
Functional and Non-Functional Claims. These claims are again decomposed until a point, where the argument is 
directly supported by strong evidence. The structure of a typical Security Case using Goal Structuring Notation is 
shown in Figure 2. Some of the major components while developing security cases: 
x What claims should be identified and decomposed?   
x What arguments should be provided to support the claims?  
x How strong is the evidence to support the argument? 
The concerns involved are to clearly identify all the functions of the system under consideration, relevant 
analysis of the claim and provide strong evidence. Hence careful study of the system’s goals and the potential 
threats, in addition to relevant standards, become very important. 
Bhanuchander Reddy Poreddy and Steven Corns / Procedia Computer Science 6 (2011) 499–504 501
 
2.2 TOOLS AND NOTATION 
Although an assurance case presented in GSN can be created using any general-purpose graphics editor, direct 
tool support for GSN is available to ease the process. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) with Adelard’s Assurance 
and Safety Case Environment (ASCE 3.5) tool [5] is used in developing the security case for the Avionic mission 
control computer. 
 
3. ANALYSIS OF ASSURANCE CASE FOR SECURITY 
    The main purpose of the MCC is to satisfy all the functions described in section 1.1. The end claim of the system 
is that the MCC system acceptably satisfies the avionics specifications. The end claim ‘satisfies avionic 
specifications’ is further subdivided into subclaims ‘functional specifications’ and ‘non-functional specifications’.  
Functional specifications include acceptably satisfying the following functions: 
1. Navigation: MCC acceptably manages aircraft flight data. 
2. Weapons Control: MCC acceptably manages weapons control. 
3. Control & Display: MCC acceptably manages and process data for display. 
4. Radar Control: MCC acceptably manages Radar control data. 
Non-functional Specifications include acceptably satisfying the following functions: 
1. Secured: MCC System is acceptably secure. 
2. Safe: MCC is acceptably safe. 
3. Robustness: System is acceptably robust. 
4. Speed: Calculation of data is acceptable. 
 
Since security specification is of our concern the next step would be decomposing the security claim into further 
subclaims. The other three non-functional items are presented for completeness of the specifications. Security claim 
(fig. 3) is further decomposed into subclaims based on integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality and 
maintainability. 
Integrity claim defines that the MCC acceptably guarantees protection of data in various different type of attacks. 
Integrity (fig. 4) is argued over serial data bus attacks, software development life cycle attacks, internal attacks and 
external attacks. Again these subclaims are analyzed in detail. Availability claim defines that the MCC System 
acceptably ensures that all the components of the system are available at all times. Availability (fig 5) is argued over 
Arbitrary failures, Operational failures and Periodic Failures. Again these subclaims are analyzed in detail.          
ARBITRARY FAILURE:
MCC System
acceptably handles all
arbitrary failures
CLAIM
Supports
ArguArbFail:
Argue about different
arbitary failures possible.
ARGUMENT
Is a subclaim of
DisplayFail:
MCC System acceptably
ensures that all displays are
available at all times
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
SensorFail:
MCC System acceptably ensures that
all Sensor and Stores Management
data is available at all times
CLAIM
Is evidence for
Sensor and Stores
Management Data is
available from Backup
Sensors in random
failures 
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Emergency
HeadUpdisplay and
Multipurpose
Display are always
available
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Simultaneous
Multipurpose
displays are
available 
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Backup Data bus is used
for Communication during
random failures
EVIDENCE
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Figure 2, Goal Structuring Notation[6] 
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Confidentiality claim states that system protects and ensures that information is accessible only to those 
authorized to have access. Confidentiality (fig 6) is argued over Cryptography, External violations and Access 
rights. Reliability claim states that system acceptably performs required functions under given conditions for 
SECURED:
MCC System is
acceptably secure
CLAIM
RELIABILITY:
MCC System acceptably
performs required functions
under given conditions for
specific period of time
CLAIM
AVAILABILITY:
MCC System acceptably
ensures that all the
components of the system are
available at all times
CLAIM
INTEGRITY:
Avionics MCC System
acceptably guarantees
protection of data in various
different type of attacks
which modify or cause loss
to data 
CLAIM
CONFIDENTIALITY:
MCC System acceptably
protects and ensures that
information is accessible only
to those authorized to have
access.
CLAIM
MAINTAINABILITY:
MCC System is acceptably
maintainable
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
Is a subclaim of
Is a subclaim of
Is a subclaim of
Is a subclaim of
Supports
SECUREARGUMENT:
Argue the MCC System
over Integrity, Availability,
Reliability,
Confidentiality and
Maintainability
ARGUMENT
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Figure 3, Security Claim 
INTEGRITY:
Avionics MCC System
acceptably guarantees
protection of data in various
different type of attacks
which modify or cause loss
to data 
CLAIM
Supports
ATTACKARGUMENT:
Argument over different
types of attacks which
result in loss or
modification of data
ARGUMENTIs a subclaim of
SERIALDATABUSATTACK:
Avionic MCC System
integrity is acceptably
secured  using the serial
data bus
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
S/WDEVELOPMENT
LIFECYCLEATTACK:
Avionic MCC System
acceptably guards
against the software
development life cycle
attacks
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
INTERNALATTACKS:
Avionic MCC System
acceptably guards
against all types of
internal attacks which
modify data and create
security vulnerabilities
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
EXTERNAL ATTACKS:
Avionic MCC System
acceptably guards
against all external
attacks which creates
security vulnerabilities
CLAIM
Created w ith ASCE Educational licence - valid for non-commercial teaching and research purposes only
Figure 4, Integrity Claim 
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specified period of time. Reliability (fig 7) is argued over Navigation, Radar control, weapons control and display 
management. These subclaims are again analyzed and also further divided into some more important subclaims and  
analyzed in detail. Maintainability subclaim is not argued further, since it is assumed to be the final subclaim. 
The detailed set of Assurance Case patterns, involving decomposition of various claims based on Integrity, 
availability, reliability, confidentiality and maintainability forming Security Case templates, is made available for 
reference at the following URL: http://web.mst.edu/~bpkf5/MCCSecurityCase/ (validated on: 31st  July 2011). 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Assurance cases for security provide strong evidence that make it possible to demonstrate that the system’s 
security requirements have been met to a reasonable degree of certainty. Security Cases can be considered while 
arguing compliance to various industry standards and regulations [2]. This analysis introduced a formal language for 
AVAILABILITY:
MCC System acceptably
ensures that all the
components of the system are
available at all times
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
PERIODIC FAILURE:
MCC System acceptably
handles periodic
failures
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
ARBITRARY FAILURE:
MCC System
acceptably handles all
arbitrary failures
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
OPERATIONALFAILURES:
MCC System
acceptably ensures it
guards against the
operational failures
CLAIM
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Figure 5, Availability Claim 
RELIABILITY:
MCC System acceptably
performs required functions
under given conditions for
specific period of time
CLAIM
Is evidence for
Testing results indicate Mean
Time to failure is in acceptable
limits
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Robustness Testing indicate
Warning Indicators are flashed
when emergency failures occur
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Diagnostic tools indicated in overload
conditions important workload tasks
are processed first to guarantee
deadlines
EVIDENCE
Is a subclaim of
NAVIGATION:
MCC System acceptably
computes current
aircraft flight data
CLAIM
Is evidence for
Sensor control computations are
performed at a rate with in acceptable
limits to keep up with the hardware
EVIDENCE
Is evidence for
Interrrupt handling is performed
with latency time in acceptable
limits
EVIDENCE
Is a subclaim of
DISPLAY MANAGEMENT:
MCC system
acceptably manages
displays under all
conditions
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
WEAPONSCONTROL:
MCC System
acceptably
manages weapons
under all conditions
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
RADARCONTROL:
MCC System acceptably
computes radar control
data
CLAIM
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Figure 7, Reliability Claim 
CONFIDENTIALITY:
MCC System acceptably
protects and ensures that
information is accessible only
to those authorized to have
access.
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
EXTERNALVIOLATIONS:
MCC System
acceptably ensures
that external entities
follow confidentiality
rules
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
CRYPTOGRAPHY:
MCC System acceptably
ensures confidentiality
through different
cryptographic techniques
CLAIM
Is a subclaim of
ACCESS RIGHTS:
Access Rights
management for
the MCC System
is acceptable
CLAIM
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Figure 6, Confidentiality Claim 
504  Bhanuchander Reddy Poreddy and Steven Corns / Procedia Computer Science 6 (2011) 499–504
documenting security attacks in a structured and reusable form using goal structuring notation. After decomposing 
all the claims, security analysts can use this framework to identify commonly occurring attack patterns, obtained 
from the attack data, and develop more trustworthy survivable systems [4]. Assurance cases assist in identifying 
loop holes that may arise when changes are made to the system. Assurance case patterns act as templates, using 
which security analysts can verify and validate the security of the systems and maintain industry standards. Creation 
of Assurance cases assist in planning and development activities. The security assurance case is applicable 
throughout the lifecycle of the project, right from planning stage to the maintenance stage. Section 3 identified 
different attack patterns possible in a generic avionic mission control computer system which can compromise 
security. Examining the current case can help determine if modifications will invalidate or change arguments and 
claims and, if so, will help identify the appropriate parts of the case that need to be updated. 
The next step is to validate the scalability of the methodology used through its application to numerous real-time 
complex world systems. Multiple attack patterns have to be generated and analyzed on the system. All the levels of 
the security case patterns have to be kept updated from different parts of the industry, so that analysts can use the 
updated security case patterns to find security vulnerabilities in their corresponding systems. If different levels of the 
generated security case patterns for the system prove insecure, it is important to understand why this particular chain 
of evidence-argument-claim reasoning was insufficient. Another challenge is to propose different methodologies of 
arriving at a compelling metric value for a given system, which can guarantee the security of the system with 
acceptable confidence level [8]. 
Generating security case patterns using Goal Structuring Notation provides a Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) use case format for considering security issues in the development of complex systems that could guarantee 
system security. Implementing these templates will enable a higher degree of confidence that security considerations 
have been met for software development. In addition, these templates could be modified for use in Systems 
Modeling Language (SysML) to provide a means to implement security checks for both the hardware and the 
software of a complex system under development. Written to a high enough level of abstraction, this work would 
provide a re-usable model based systems engineering tool that could be quickly adapted to any system under 
development to increase confidence that that systems security will not be compromised. 
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